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1 Introduction
The variety of the Sino-Tibetan language Newari spoken in the Kathmandu
Valley of Nepal has an intriguing system of verbal marking. Verbs are not
marked for the person value of the subject. Instead, a special form of the verb
called the egophoric (or conjunct) form is found in first person statements, in
second person polar questions, and in de se speech reports. A different form
(non-ego, or disjunct) appears elsewhere. The egophoric verb form is glossed
ego in these examples (from Hargreaves 2005, ex. (51) to (56)):
(1) a. j˜ı:
1.erg
a:pwa
much
twan-a.
drink-past.ego
‘I drank a lot’
b. chã/wã
2.erg/3.erg
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-perf
‘You/(s)he drank a lot.’
(2) a. chã
2.erg
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-past.ego
la?
Q
‘Did you drink a lot?’
b. j˜ı:/wã
1.erg/3.erg
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-perf
la?
Q
‘Did I/(s)he drink a lot?’
In speech reports, ego-marking on the embedded verb indicates that its subject
is coreferential with the reported speaker (from Hargreaves in press, ex. (8) and
(11)):
(3) a. syam-ã
Syam-erg
wã
3.erg
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-past.ego
dhaka:
comp
dhal-a
say-perf
‘Syami said that hei drank too much.’
b. syam-ã
Syam-erg
wã
3.erg
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-perf
dhaka:
comp
dhal-a
say-perf
‘Syami said that hej drank too much.’
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Egophoric marking also interacts with evidential markers in interesting ways,
as we will see later. Such egophoric systems, also known as ‘conjunct-disjunct
marking’ systems, are found in a variety of languages scattered about the world,
including languages spoken in the Himalayas, the Caucasus, the Andes, and
Highlands New Guinea (San Roque et al., 2015).1
How can we explain the distribution of ego-marking? What is its semantic
function? In this paper we suggest, following Wechsler (in press), that ego-
marking on a verb earmarks its verb phrase as a self-ascription, that is, the
kind of property that a person knowingly ascribes to herself (Lewis, 1979). We
model this special semantic content of an ego-marked VP as a centered worlds
proposition, that is, a set of world-agent pairs. The distribution of ego markers
will then be seen to follow from the interaction of that semantic content with
the illocutionary pragmatics. Since the ego-marked VP is to be self-ascribed,
it normally requires a first person subject when it serves as the predicate of
a declarative main clause that expresses the content of an assertion (as shown
in (1a)). When asked a polar question, the addressee is invited to self-ascribe
either the question’s prejacent or its negation, hence such a question normally
requires a second person subject (as shown in (2a)).
In the next section, we round out the description of the egophoric system of
Newari. In light of these facts, we then discuss two previous approaches, which
we label indexical and evidential, and motivate our account. Then we model
the semantics of egophoric marking using a logic for self-reference that we call
‘Egophoric Logic.’ Along the way, we develop a theory of how de se attitudes
are communicated.
2 Egophoricity in Newari
The hallmark of egophoric verb marking systems is the ‘interrogative flip’ pat-
tern illustrated by the Newari examples (1a) and (2a) above and shown schemat-
ically in Table 1. The Newari paradigm for the verb meaning ‘to go’ is shown
in Table 2. The perfective/imperfective aspect distinction is neutralized in the
egophoric form.2
Polar questions take ego only with second person subjects. But a rhetorical
question expressing an assertion works like a declarative clause: ego marking
is used with a first person subject but not a second person subject:
1Languages with egophoric marking systems include the Sino-Tibetan languages Kath-
mandu Newari (Hale, 1980; Hargreaves, 2005, in press; Wechsler, in press) and Lhasa Ti-
betan (Delancey, 1997; Garrett, 2001); the Barbacoan languages Tsafiki ((Dickinson, 2000)),
Guambiano, and Cha’palaa (San Roque et al., 2015); Akhvakh (Nakh-Daghestanian; Creis-
sels 2008), the Trans New Guinean languages Oksapmin (Loughnane, 2009)), Duna and Kaluli
(San Roque et al., 2015)). For surveys of these and other such languages see San Roque et al.
(2015); Floyd et al. (in press).
2Following the conventions of Devanagri orthography and transliteration a represents a low
central vowel while a represents a low back vowel.
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declarative interrogative
1st person ego —
2nd person — ego
3rd person — —
Table 1: Schematic paradigm for egophoric systems
declarative interrogative
1st person wan-a wã: / wan-a
2nd person wã: / wan-a wan-a
3rd person wã: / wan-a wã: / wan-a
Table 2: Finite past forms of ‘to go’ (perfective/imperfective)
(4) Ji
I.abs
ana
there
wan-a
go-ego.pst
la?
Q
‘Did I go there? (I most certainly did not!)’ (Hale 1980, 100)
(5) Cha
you.abs
wal-a
come-pst
la?
Q
‘Did you come? (You most certainly did not!)’ (Hale 1980, 100)
This shows that ego marking is conditioned by the actual illocutionary function,
not the syntax of declaratives and questions.
As noted in the introduction, ego-marking is also found in speech reports.
With ego-marking on the embedded verb, its subject is understood as corefer-
ential with the reported speaker (repeated from (3)):
(6) a. syam-ã
Syam-erg
wã
3.erg
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-past.ego
dhaka:
comp
dhal-a
say-perf
‘Syami said that hei drank too much.’
b. syam-ã
Syam-erg
wã
3.erg
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-perf
dhaka:
comp
dhal-a
say-perf
‘Syami said that hej drank too much.’
(from Hargreaves in press, ex. (8) and (11))
First or second person pronouns can replace the subject in (6a), in sentences
meaning ‘I said that I drank too much’ or ‘You said that you drank too much.’
The embedded verb is ego-marked as long as the embedded and matrix subjects
corefer.
Actually, coreference between the embedded and matrix subjects is not quite
sufficient to license ego-marking. ego-marking appears only in reports of true
reference de se, where the agent knowingly self-refers. Consider the following
scenario: Syam is looking at a photo from a wild party in which someone is
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wearing a lampshade on his head. Syam points at the intoxicated partier and
says to you, ‘That guy drank too much’; unbeknownst to Syam, it is himself in
the picture. In that scenario, the ego-marked sentence (6a) is false. ‘Syam’ and
‘he’ corefer, as indicated by the subscripts. But for the egophoric verb form to
appear it is not sufficient that the person uttering (6a) knows that ‘Syam’ and
‘he’ corefer: Syam must know that he referred to himself in the reported speech
act.3 Thus an ego-marked predicate expresses a self-ascription: self-reference
rather than just co-reference. This fact will provide crucial motivation for our
analysis of egophoricity (see Section 3).
Summarizing our description of Newari so far, we may say that the subject of
an ego-marked verb refers to the epistemic authority for the clause (Hargreaves
in press, cf. Hale 1980). The epistemic authority is the participant whose
commitment to the at-issue content of the clause is projected by the speech act.4
Different types of speech acts typically (but see presently for exceptions due to
evidentials) treat different discourse participants as the epistemic authority:
• In simple declaratives: the speaker
• In polar interrogatives: the addressee
• In de se speech reports: the reported source of the speech
The subject of an ego-marked verb refers to epistemic authority, so in declar-
atives it tends to be a 1st person pronoun, in polar questions it tends to be a
2nd person pronoun, and in speech reports it can be 1st, 2nd, or 3rd person,
matching the person of the reported speaker.
While the speaker of a declarative is normally the authority responsible for
her statement, she will sometimes abdicate authority for the statement, placing
the onus on a third party. This can be done with certain forms indicating the
evidential source, including English phrases like according to John:
(7) According to John, the meeting was cancelled.
In making this statement, the at-issue proposition that the meeting was can-
celled is attributed to John, rather than the speaker. Note that such evidential-
marked sentences sometimes escape Moore’s Paradox:
(8) a. #The meeting was cancelled, but I don’t believe that the meeting was
cancelled.
b. According to John the meeting was cancelled, but I don’t believe
that the meeting was cancelled.
3Notice by contrast that the English sentence provided as translation for (6a) is true, or
at worst a bit misleading, in the scenario: Syam did say that he drank too much even if he
did not realize he was talking about himself.
4Other terms for equivalent or closely related notions include: commitment holder (Krifka,
2014), informant (Bickel, 2008), epistemic source (Hargreaves 2005), seat of knowledge (Speas
& Tenny, 2003), locutionary actor (Hale, 1980), locutor (Aikhenvald, 2004), and judge (Mc-
Cready, 2007).
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In the present terms we can say that (8a) seems contradictory (hence the #
symbol) because asserting that p also implies an assertion that the speaker
believes that p— but only if the speaker is the authority for the assertion.5 In
(8b) John, not the speaker, is the authority, so the oddness disappears.
Newari sentences with evidential markers such as khanisa can appear without
ego-marking even when the subject is a first person pronoun:
(9) j˜ı:
1.erg
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-perf
khanisa
evid
‘It appears I drank a lot.’
In this non-ego-marked sentence, the evidential source is understood to be
someone other than the speaker. Assuming this evidential source is the author-
ity, then example (9) is consistent with the generalization that ego-marking
appears on a verb if and only if its subject refers to the authority.
For the same reason that evidentials permit first person without ego-marking,
evidentials also permit third person with ego-marking. The following sentences
containing the evidential marker hã illustrate this.
(10) a. syam- a
Syam-erg
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-past.ego
hã
evid
‘According to Syami, hei drank a lot.’
b. wã
3.erg
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-perf
hã
evid
‘It is said that he drank a lot.’
(from Hargreaves in press, ex. (12) and (10))
In sentence (10a) the verb has ego marking, and its subject Syam is understood
as the source of the information. Without ego-marking as in (10b), the source
of this information is understood to be hearsay originating from someone other
than the referent of the subject pronoun wã ‘he/she’. Like the earlier example,
these too are consistent with the generalization that ego-marking appears on
a verb if and only if its subject refers to the authority.
Newari ego marking is restricted to verbs describing intentional actions.
This restriction to intentional action is not shared by all languages with egophoric
verb marking systems, but it is attested in some others such as the Barbacoan
language Tsafiki (Dickinson, 2000). Hargreaves (2005, in press) called verbs
used to describe intentional actions control verbs. They include wan- ‘go’, twan-
‘drink’, and many others. Control verbs satisfying the conditions described
above (e.g. first person declaratives) take the ego form unless modified with
an adverb such as ‘unwittingly’ that explicitly cancels the intentionality. Verbs
that do not describe intentional actions never take ego marking, even with a
first person subject of a declarative. For example, the Newari non-control verb
thyan- ‘arrive’ describes an unintentional event. To describe intentional arriv-
5This is a ‘paradox’ because a sentence like (8a) seems contradictory, but does not express
a logical contradiction.
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ing, the root thyan- must appear in an adverbial form modifying a control verb
such as wan- ‘go’, as in thyanka wan- lit. ‘go arrive (there)’. Still other verbs
are fluid: with ego-marking the action is interpreted as intentional and with-
out it the action is interpreted as unintentional (even without an adverb such
as ‘unwittingly’).
Summing up the description:
• An ego-marked sentence describes an intentional action, whose inten-
tional agent is expressed by the grammatical subject.
• The subject of an ego-marked sentence is the epistemic authority for the
clause.
– In simple declaratives:
– typically the speaker (1st person uses)
– but can be deferred with evidentials
– In interrogatives: the addressee (2nd person uses)
– In embedded clauses: the reported source (any person: depends on
person of the matrix subject)
• The epistemic authority has a de se attitude towards the at-issue propo-
sition.
3 Egophoricity as self-ascription
Most previous accounts of egophoric marking systems fall into two types: in-
dexical and evidential accounts.6 In indexical accounts, an egophoric marker is
seen as an indexical similar to a person marker on the verb, except that instead
of indexing the speaker or addressee, it indexes the epistemic authority (Bickel
& Nichols, 2007). As a verbal inflection it flags the coincidence of the epistemic
authority and an argument role of the verb, usually the subject as in Newari (in
some egophoric languages different arguments can trigger egophoric marking).
Note that such an account would require a Kaplanian ‘monster’, since it targets
the reported authority in speech reports rather than the epistemic authority of
the global speech context (recall (3)). Assuming this is permissible, an indexical
view of Newari would account for almost all the facts in our description, and our
own account builds upon this approach. But nothing about the indexical analy-
sis predicts the obligatory reference de se observed with embedded clauses. An
indexical account predicts co-reference between the subject and the epistemic
authority, but it fails to predict self-reference by the epistemic authority.
The second approach is to view egophoric forms as a kind of evidential in-
dicating the nature of the interlocutors’ knowledge of the situation described
in the utterance, namely direct personal experience of an event (Garrett 2001,
inter alia). A participant in an event has direct personal knowledge of the event,
6See San Roque et al. (2015) for discussion.
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so declaratives with a first person subject take egophoric marking. Evidential
markers are known to undergo ‘interrogative flip’: in declarative statements, the
evidential indicates the nature of the speaker’s evidence, while in a question it
flips to express the addressee’s (presumed) evidence. One variant of the eviden-
tial account sees the non-egophoric forms as miratives (indicators of surprise).
On that view, the egophoric forms are non-miratives, since a person is unlikely
to be surprised by news of her own actions (Dickinson, 2000; Delancey, 1997).
If Newari egophoric marking indicated knowledge gained through direct per-
sonal experience, then the restriction to verbs of intentional action would be
surprising. One might rather expect ego marking for eventualities to which
the subject participant has privileged access, such as experiencer verbs. But in
fact Newari experiencer verbs like gya(t)- ‘fear’, ciku(l)- ‘be.cold’, thu(l)- ‘un-
derstand’ and si(l)- ‘know’ are non-control verbs, which never take the ego
form.
In that respect, Newari egophoric verbs contrast with the behavior of ‘pri-
vate’ experiencer predicates in Japanese, Korean, and other languages (see
Tenny 2006). Like the Newari egophoric verbs, these experiencer predicates
are also known to undergo an interrogative flip, as illustrated here with Korean
(from Chun & Zubin 1990):
(11) a. Na-nun/*Ne-nun
I-top/you-top
Changho-ka
Changho-nom
coh-ass-e.
like-pst-dc
‘I/You liked Changho.’
b. Ne-nun/*Na-nun
you-top/I-top
Changho-ka
Changho-nom
coh-yess-ni?
like-pst-qu
‘Did you/I like Changho?’
With such experiencer predicates interrogative flip is plausibly motivated by
the fact that the experiencer has privileged access to her subjective experiences
and feelings. In contrast the interrogative flip observed with Newari egophoric
morphology lacks this motivation, since it is found with intentional acts like
drinking, which is directly observable by people other than the drinker.
In sum, the indexical account fails to explain the obligatory self-ascriptive in-
terpretation of Newari egophoricity (reference de se), and the evidential account
receives counterevidence from the lack of egophoric marking on stative experi-
encer predicates, following from the restriction to intentional action. Zu (to
appear) observes that both of these properties – reference de se and restriction
to intentional action – are also found with some obligatory control constructions
in many languages. The restriction to intentional action is illustrated by this
English example (from Farkas 1988, ex. 22a):
(12) a. Mary convinced John to leave/ #to be tall/blue eyed.
b. Mary convinced John that he is tall/blue eyed.
The infinitival VP complement of convince must denote an intentional action,
a restriction not shared by non-controlled complement clauses as in (12b).
Obligatory reference de se, i.e. self-ascription, is a well-known property of
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many control constructions (Morgan, 1970; Chierchia, 1990):
(13) a. Syam claimed [to have drunk too much]. (self-ascriptive only)
b. Syami claimed [that hei drank too much]. (self-ascriptive or not)
Sentence (13a) reports on Syam’s self-ascription of the property of having drunk
too much. In contrast, (13b), even on the coreferential interpretation indicated
by the subscripts, does not necessarily report a self-ascription, since that sen-
tence can be true even if Syam is not aware that it is himself he refers to. For
example, recall the scenario above: Syam points at a picture of a drunken man
wearing a lampshade, without realizing it is himself, and says to you, ‘That guy
drank too much!’ In this scenario (13a) is false while (13b) is true.
So the semantic content of the infinitival VP [to have drunk too much] in
(13a) is a self-ascription. Self-ascriptive semantic content has been modeled
using centered worlds (Lewis, 1979). These are worlds augmented with a ‘You
are here’ pointer, as it were, designating the center of the world. If we let centers
be agents then a centered world is a pair consisting of a designated agent and
a world. A centered worlds proposition is a set of centered worlds. (As Lewis
points out, a centered worlds proposition can also be seen as a property that
holds of an individual: in (13), the property of being in a world where one drank
too much.)
The content of [to have drunk too much] in (13a), then, is the set of pairs
⟨a,w⟩ such that agent a drank too much in w. The subordinate clause in (13b)
expresses an ordinary uncentered proposition.7
(14) a. Content of the bracketed infinitival VP in (13a):
{⟨a,w⟩ ∶ a drank too much in w}
b. Content of the bracketed complement clause in (13b):
{w ∶ Syam drank too much in w}
We propose that the Newari finite ego-marked VPs in (15) (repeated from (1a)
and (3) above) have exactly the same semantic content as the infinitival VP in
(13a), namely the centered proposition given in (14a).8
(15) a. j˜ı:
1.erg
[a:pwa
much
twan-a]
drink-past.ego
‘I drank too much.’
b. syam-ã
Syam-erg
wã
3.erg
[a:pwa
much
twan-a]
drink-past.ego
dhaka:
comp
dhal-a
say-perf
‘Syami said that hei drank too much.’
Such a centered proposition is ipso facto self-ascribed by whoever commits to it.
7Alternatively the subordinate clause in (13b) can be modeled as a centered proposition
in which the truth function does not depend on the agent:
{⟨a,w⟩ ∶ Syam drank too much in w}
8This proposal is made informally in Wechsler (in press).
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One immediate consequence is that any declarative assertion made with such a
finite VP as its predicate must normally be predicated of the speaker, hence in a
main clause assertion the VP’s subject must normally be a first person pronoun.
The other facts described above will also be shown to follow from this analysis,
once we put in place a proper theory of the discourse pragmatics.
4 Analysis
4.1 Indexicals vs. egophors
Our analysis builds upon McCready’s (2007) analysis of certain Japanese in-
dexicals that show an interrogative flip pattern similar to conjunct/disjunct
marking. In the Kansai dialect of Japanese, zibun as the subject of a private
experiencer predicate can be used to pick out the speaker, as in (16), but can
also be used to pick out the addressee in an interrogative as in (17).
(16) zibun-wa
zibun-top
horensoo-ga
spinach-nom
kirai
dislike
ya
cop
‘I don’t like spinach.’
(17) zibun-wa
zibun-top
horensoo
spinach
kirai-nan?
dislike-cop.Q
‘Don’t you like spinach?’
McCready assumes that there is a ‘judge’ parameter in the spirit of Lasersohn
(2005) in the Kaplanian context, and that the question operator is a Kaplanian
‘monster’ that fixes the judge parameter to the addressee. Then zibun is an
indexical referring to the judge. This corresponds to the indexical analysis of
egophoric marking as described in Section 3. It is close to what we need in order
to capture the distribution of conjunct/disjunct marking in Newari. But if we
were to use the same kind of analysis, we would not be able to capture the de
se implications.
On our proposal, we do use an additional element of the Kaplanian context
as McCready does. Instead of ‘judge’ we call it ‘authority’, and it is meant to
capture the notion of evidential source. But we also introduce another agent
parameter as a refinement on content, so that our propositions denote centered
worlds; the agent parameter represents the center of the centered world. This
gives us a level of content that can serve as the object of an attitude de se.
Our claim is that egophoric marking picks out this latter agent parameter,
corresponding to the perspectival center. We then capture the generalization
that the subject of the sentence is the authority indirectly, through a constraint
on assertion.
To do this, we use a logical representation language that we call Egophoric
Logic (EL). EL is similar to Kaplan’s (1977) logic of indexicals in that the ex-
tension of an expression is relative to a model M , an assignment g, a context
of utterance c, and a world w. What differs is that the extension also depends
on an agent a, which serves as the perspectival center. This idea derives from
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Lewis’s (1979) idea of centered worlds, and has been implemented similarly for
the analysis of obligatory control by Anand & Nevins (2004) and Stephenson
(2007), among others. It is also formally identical to Lasersohn’s (2005) im-
plementation of relativism for predicates of personal taste, although here, in
contrast to Lasersohn’s system, the agent parameter is not intended as a judge
for matters of opinion.
We define the extension of an EL expression φ relative to model M , context
c, variable assignment g, world w, and agent a, and write it as follows:
JφK
M,g,c,w,a
(We ignore time throughout.) The agent parameter allows us to distinguish be-
tween two types of intension: centered intension, and ordinary (or ‘uncentered’)
intension. The centered intension of φ is defined relative to a specified model,
assignment, and context. With respect to model M , assignment g, and context
c, the centered intension of φ, JφK
M,g,c
¢
, is a function from centered worlds ⟨a,w⟩
to the corresponding extension:
(18) Definition: centered intension
JφK
M,g,c
¢
= f ∶ f(⟨a,w⟩) = JφK
M,g,c,w,a
To get an ordinary intension, one must in addition specify an agent. With
respect to modelM , assignment g, context c, and agent a, the ordinary intension
of φ, JφK
M,g,c,a
$
, is a function from ordinary possible worlds to the corresponding
extensions:
(19) Definition: ordinary intension
JφK
M,g,c,a
$
= f ∶ f(w) = JφK
M,g,c,w,a
So the centered intension of a sentence (wrt. a given M , g and c) will be a
centered worlds proposition, and the ordinary/uncentered intension of a sentence
(wrt. a given M , g, c and a) will be an ordinary possible worlds proposition.
With these tools, we can distinguish between three types of phenomena:
(i) first person indexicals, (ii) authority indexicals, and (iii) egophors. For our
logical language EL, we stipulate that the constant i denotes the speaker of the
context sp(c), and that the constant auth denotes the authority of the context
au(c).
(20) Semantics of the first person indexical in EL
JiK
M,g,c,w,a
= sp(c)
(21) Semantics of the authority indexical in EL
JauthK
M,g,c,w,a
= au(c)
These are both indexicals in the sense that their meaning depends on the current
speech context. An egophor, on the other hand, is not an indexical; an egophor
picks out the perspectival center, which is a content parameter. We designate
the constant self as an egophor in EL. The extension of this expression with
respect to agent a is a.
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(22) Semantics of the egophor in EL
JselfK
M,g,c,w,a
= a
This opens up two possible analyses of conjunct/disjunct marking: either as an
authority indexical, as McCready proposes for Japanese zibun, or as an egophor.
For Newari, we advocate an egophoric analysis.
If we were to give a fragment of Newari in the style of Montague’s (1974)
‘Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary English’, mapping expressions
of Newari to expressions of EL, we would specify that the first person pronoun
j˜ı: translates into EL as the first person indexical constant i:
(23) EL translation for Newari first person singular pronoun
j˜ı: ↝ i
The egophoric marker on the other hand invokes self. More specifically, it is
a partial identity function on predicates that takes a predicate P and returns
a predicate that holds of x if P holds of x and is defined if x is self, the
perspectival center.9
(24) EL translation for Newari conjunct marker
a ↝ λPet . λx .P (x) ∧ ∂(x = self)
Assuming an appropriate translation for ‘drank a lot’, and appropriate compo-
sition rules (Function Application, etc.), the translation for j˜ı: a:pwa twan-a ‘I
drank-ego a lot’ will then be as follows:
(25) j˜ı: a:pwa twan-a
↝ drank-alot(i) ∧ ∂(self = i)
The centered intension of the formula in (25) with respect to context c is a
function that picks out the set of centered worlds ⟨a,w⟩ such that a = sp(c) and
a drank a lot in w. This proposition is something that can serve as the object
of an attitude de se, following Lewis (1979).
4.2 Assertion
Following much recent work, we treat speech acts, including assertions and ques-
tions, as updates on discourse contexts. In an assertion, the centered intension
of the clause corresponding to the at-issue content will be what the authority of
the context becomes committed to. So upon asserting φ, the authority becomes
committed to the centered intension of φ. If participant x is committed to a
set of centered worlds P , then for all centered worlds ⟨a,w⟩ in P , x publicly
commits to the belief that he or she may be a in w.
However, this does not mean that centered worlds propositions are in the
common ground, because de se attitudes of this kind are not generally shared.
This point is made colorfully by Egan (2010, p. 279), who points out: “Then
9∂ can be read ‘partial’; it implements presupposition by yielding undefinedness when the
formula in its scope is not true (Beaver, 2001; Beaver & Krahmer, 2001).
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Component Type
Participants x1, ..., xn list of individuals
Discourse commitments DCx1 , ...DCxn each a set of centered worlds
Table T stack of centered questions
QUD (top of the Table stack) set of centered propositions
Common ground CG set of non-centered worlds
Projected Set PS set of common grounds
(one for each in the QUD)
Table 3: Discourse model
introductions would be disastrous. The effect of Mr. Malkovich’s assertion of ‘I
am John Malkovich’ (if it were accepted) would be to add being John Malkovich
to the conversation’s presuppositions.” To believe a centered proposition is
believe that one is at the center of each of the centered worlds in that set. So
it cannot be the de se belief that the addressee acquires in communication; if
Syam expresses his de se attitude by saying to Mary, ‘I drank a lot’, then Mary
does not come to believe that she (Mary) drank a lot. (See Pagin 2015 for a
clear and thorough review of the problem of de se communication.)
So our discourse model, which borrows heavily from Farkas & Bruce (2010),
is as follows (summarized in Table 3). We have a set of Participants x1, ..., xn,
and each one is associated with a set of Discourse commitments DCx1 , ...DCxn .
The discourse commitments of a participant are represented as a set of centered
worlds, so these are propositions that one can have a de se attitude to. We
also have a Table T , following Farkas and Bruce, which is a stack of questions
under discussion. We will assume that these questions under discussion are
centered, in the sense that they are sets of centered worlds propositions. So in
particular the QUD, which is the top of the Table stack, is a set of centered
worlds propositions. The Common Ground CG on the other hand is a set of
non-centered, ordinary possible worlds. We also adopt from Farkas and Bruce a
notion of a Projected Set PS, which is a set of projected future common grounds
corresponding to different ways of resolving the issue on the table.
Speech acts are operations that update such contexts. If φ is asserted in
context c, the following actions take place:
• The centered intension of φ is added to au(c)’s discourse commitments.
• The singleton set containing the centered intension of φ, {JφK
M,g,c
¢ }, is
pushed on the Table.
• A common ground is projected in the Projected Set which integrates the
authority-uncentered intension of φ, JφK
M,g,c,au(c)
$
.
Note that the authority of the context au(c) is not always the speaker, as Faller
2006 and Murray 2010, i.a., have emphasized in connection with evidentials, so
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it is not always the speaker that becomes committed to the centered intension
of φ. The centered intension of φ is also pushed on the Table, in the case of
an assertion. But it is not a centered intension that goes in the Projected Set,
and the common ground, if the proposal is accepted; rather it is the result of
uncentering p with au(c) goes in the common ground: the authority-uncentered
intension of φ, JφK
M,g,c,au(c)
$
. This is an ordinary possible worlds proposition
that is obtained by saturing the perspectival center parameter with the au-
thority of the context. So when the proposal is accepted, the other discourse
participants need not acquire a de se attitude to the centered worlds proposition.
Let us consider some examples of assertions. In (26), repeated from (1a)
above, we have a sentence whose centered intension is centered around the
speaker, in the sense that all pairs ⟨a,w⟩ in the centered intension are such
that a = sp(c). Since the speaker is the authority, the authority can unprob-
lematically take on a discourse commitment to this centered intension, and no
problems will arise when we put the authority-uncentered version in the common
ground.
(26) j˜ı:
1.erg
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-past.ego
‘I drank-ego a lot’
In (27), repeated from (1b) above, the centered intension is centered around the
addressee, but the authority is still the speaker.
(27) *chã
2.erg
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-past.ego
‘You drank-ego a lot.’
This is problematic, as it should be. The speaker probably does not want to self-
ascribe being the addressee, and furthermore, the authority-uncentered version
will be a contradictory proposition, the empty set.
In the case of reportative evidential marking, we propose that the source
of the information being reported be considered the authority of the context
au(c). This individual, rather than the speaker, is committed to the content of
the clause. Everything else is the same; the singleton set containing the cen-
tered intension of φ, {JφK
M,g,c
¢
}, is pushed on the Table, and a common ground
is projected in the Projected Set which integrates the authority-uncentered in-
tension of φ, JφK
M,g,c,au(c)
$
. Thus in the presence of an evidential, if the verb has
egophoric marking, and the subject is third person, the subject should be the
source of the evidential report. Since evidential marking is used to indicate that
the authority is someone other than the speaker, we predict that there should
not be egophoric marking on the verb in the presence of evidential marking with
a first person subject.
Now let us consider embedded cases like (3), repeated here as (28).
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(28) syam-ã
Syam-erg
wã
3.erg
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-past.ego
dhaka:
comp
dhal-a
say-perf
‘Syami said that hei drank too much.’
To account for such cases, we adopt the generalized Hintikka semantics for
embedding verbs posited to account for de se in obligatory control (Pearson,
submitted), and formalize it using our formal representation language EL. Like
ordinary models, a model for EL will determine a domain of individualsDe, a set
of worldsW , and an interpretation function I determining the extensions of all of
the non-logical constants in all the worlds; in addition, it will distinguish a subset
of the individuals corresponding to the agents A which can be at the center of
a centered world, and determine a set of modal accessibility relations, one for
each of the n modalities covered by the modal. These include Rdox, the doxastic
accessibility relation and Rsay, which captures the relation between agents and
the propositions they express. Following Stalnaker (2014), we model modal
accessibility relations as relations among centered worlds. So ⟨a,w⟩ stands in
Rdox to ⟨a
′,w′⟩ if and only if a believes herself in w to be a′ in w′. Similarly,
⟨a,w⟩ stands in Rsay ⟨a
′,w′⟩ if and only if it is compatible with what a says in
w for a to be a′ in w′.
We can then say that an agent a says P in world w according to M iff for
all ⟨a,w⟩ and ⟨a′,w′⟩:
If ⟨a,w⟩ Rsay⟨a
′,w′⟩ then P(⟨a′,w′⟩) = T.
Let us then define the logical constant says in EL as follows:
(29) JsaysK
M,g,c,w,a
= f ∶ f(x,P) = T iff x says P in w according to M .
This is how we represent the Newari correlate of the verb says.
To complete the analysis, we also need to assume that an embedded finite
clause of the form [CP φ] is translated into EL as φˆ′, where φ′ is the ordinary
translation of φ, and ˆ is a Montagovian ‘hat’ operator giving the centered
intension, so Jˆ φK
M,c,g,w,a
= JφK
M,c,g
¢
. (Recall that the centered intension of φ
wrt to M , g, and c, written JφK
M,g,c
¢
, is that function f such that f(⟨a,w⟩) =
JφK
M,g,c,w,a
). Thus for Syam says that he drank-EGO a lot, we obtain the
following EL formula as a representation of its meaning:
(30) says(siam, [ˆdrank-alot(x) ∧ x = self])
This correctly predicts that the sentence entails that Syam self-ascribes having
drunk a lot.
This analysis also correctly predicts that in multiple embedding, ego is
triggered only by the closest reported speaker (Zu, 2016).
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(31) Thanedara
policeman.erg
dhal-a
say-pst
ki
that
[Syam-a
Syam-erg
swikareyat-a
admit-pst
ki
that
[wa
s/he
daa
money
kuy-a]]
steal-pst.ego.
‘The policeman1 said that Syam2 admitted that he∗1/2/∗3 stole the
money.’
(32) Thanedara
policeman.erg
dhal-a
say-pst
ki
that
[Syam-a
Syam-erg
swikareyat-a
admit-pst
ki
that
[wa
s/he
daa
money
kut-a]].
steal-pst
‘The policeman1 said that Syam2 admitted that he1/∗2/3 stole the money.’
In this case, only Syam (not the policeman) commits to the centered intension of
the proposition ‘he stole.ego the money’. ego-marking on ‘stole’ identifies its
subject ‘he’ as the perspectival center; thus ‘he’ must be interpreted as Syam.
An indexical account would require additional stipulations in order to derive
this result.
4.3 Questions
Now let us consider questions. Recall from (2) above that Did I drink a lot?
does not carry ego-marking, and Did you drink a lot? does.
(33) a. *j˜ı:
1.erg
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-past.ego
la
Q
‘Did I drink-ego a lot?’
b. j˜ı:
1.erg
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-perf
la
Q
‘Did I drink a lot?’
(34) a. chã
2.erg
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-past.ego
la
Q
‘Did you drink-ego a lot?’
b. *chã
2.erg
a:pwa
much
twan-a
drink-perf
la
Q
‘Did you drink a lot?’
Let’s assume that the meaning of a polar question is a set containing two
centered propositions, one for the ‘yes’ answer and one for the ‘no’ answer.10
J?φK
M,g,c
¢
= {JφK
M,g,c
¢
, J¬φK
M,g,c
¢
}
Both propositions are functions that can yield T, F, or m; so the question
may contain presuppositions. This set of two answers gets pushed on the Table
when the question is asked, and then common grounds integrating uncentered
10We will not give a compositional account of questions and their presuppositions here, but
one viable option would be to follow in the style suggested by Champollion et al. (2015).
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versions of both answers are projected in the Projected Set, both uncentered
via the authority. Now, the speech act of asking a question can be defined as
follows. If ?φ is asked in context c:
• {JφK
M,g,c
¢
, J¬φK
M,g,c
¢
} is pushed on the Table
• Common grounds integrating JφK
M,g,c,au(c)
$
and J¬φK
M,g,c,au(c)
$
are pro-
jected.
The intuition behind our explanation for the distribution of ego-marking in
question is that the addressee, who is the authority in the case of a question,
should in principle be able to commit to the centered propositions corresponding
to any given answer. This echoes an intuition that has been expressed previously
that the ego form in a qestion anticipates the form to be used by the addressee
in her answer (Hale 1980; Woodbury (1986, p. 192, fn. 3)).
Formally, we say that a projected set is viable iff it contains at least one
non-empty common ground. If the propositions at the top of the Table stack
are centered around a, and the authority is b ≠ a, then empty common grounds
will be projected.
For example, take example (33b), Did I drink a lot? The meaning of the
question is a set with two elements; call them p and p. Both p and p are centered
around the speaker.11
• {⟨a,w⟩ ∶ a = sp(c) and a drank a lot in w} = p
• {⟨a,w⟩ ∶ a = sp(c) and a didn’t drink a lot in w} = p
If we uncenter these with the authority au(c) = ad(c), then we get the empty
set in both cases.
• {w ∶ ⟨ad(c),w⟩ ∈ p} = ∅
• {w ∶ ⟨ad(c),w⟩ ∈ p} = ∅
This means that the projected set is not viable, so the example is correctly
predicted to be infelicitous. On the other hand, there would be no problem if
the subject was the addressee, given that the propositions in question are both
centered around the addressee.
Let us summarize very briefly. We assume that an assertion, question, or
answer (i) pushes a set of centered worlds propositions on the Table, and (ii)
projects a set of common grounds obtained by updating the current common
ground with authority-uncentered intensions, one for each element of the QUD.
But there is a key constraint, namely that the Projected Set must be viable,
so there must be at least one element of the Table whose authority-uncentered
version is not a contradiction. With this constraint, we can account for the
distribution of egophoric marking in questions.
11Here we are playing a bit fast and loose, not distinguishing between sets and their char-
acteristic functions.
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5 Conclusion
Prima facie, conjunct/disjunct marking in Newari could be analyzed either as
a form of indexicality, tracking the authority of the current speech context, as
a form of evidentiality, or as a form of egophoricity. We have argued in favor
of an egophoric analysis, and sketched one that captures the basic properties of
conjunct/disjunct marking in assertions and questions.
A possible explanation for the Kathmandu Newari ego markers’ being this
way comes from their historical orgin. According to David Hargreaves (p.c.),
the ego forms are not derived from person morphemes. Rather, they were
historically non-finite forms that assumed finite tense-aspect functions; evidence
for this comes from the fact that they are cognate with non-finite forms in
Dolakha Newar, which, unlike Kathmandu Newar, has a full person/subject
agreement system. Recall that Newari ego-marking is restricted to verbs of
intentional action, and that obligatory control verbs often impose a similar
restriction (Zu, 2016). This leads us to speculate: Could Newari egophoricity
have arisen through the de-subordination of control constructions?
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